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THE CULTURE AND CONFLICT REVIEW 
Arctic Security in a Warming World: Challenges and Opportunities
Barry S. Zellen, 4/22/2011 
As the Arctic continues to thaw, and with its thaw, to integrate with the world ocean and the maritime
economy that unites the world, the question of which of America’s regional Unified Combatant
Commands (UCC) is best suited to defend the Arctic has been increasingly discussed by American
defense officials and their allied counterparts. The Arctic basin overlaps the Area of Operations (AO) of
three of America’s regional commands: Northcom, Pacom, and Eucom. Each bears responsibility for
part of the Arctic’s defense, but not the whole. However, the Arctic, while enclosed by the high North
Pacific region, the high North Atlantic, and the northern coast and offshore islands of high North
America, has not affected the history of each defense sector equally, and consideration of the historical
context might illuminate the quest for the appropriate UCC for meeting the challenges of Arctic defense
and security in the coming years.
NORTHCOM, which is responsible for the defense of North America, seems a likely choice to some –
though the North American Arctic remains the most secure part of the Far North, thanks in large
measure to the sparse population and extreme isolation of Canada’s northern archipelago. And then
there’s PACOM – which is responsible for securing the Pacific, including Alaska in the high North
Pacific, and which has incorporated the World War II-era Alaska Command into its AO. PACOM’s
mission thus includes the defense of a region hotly contested by Japan in World War II and later
threatened by the rising Soviet fleet in the Cold War, a mission it shares with NORTHCOM – which
makes it a likely choice to some for coordinating the defense of the Arctic.
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Defining Arctic security through a Pacific lens has a certain logic, given that the industrialized trading
states of Northeast Asia have a strong economic interest in the emerging trade routes across the top of
the world, and that China, America’s next most likely peer competitor, eyes the Arctic through a Pacific
lens, something Tokyo did a generation earlier. But widespread usage of northern shipping lanes still
remains a long way off – even if some tentative seasonal use is already being made of the Northern Sea
Route, the Arctic Bridge between Murmansk and Churchill,  and the famed Northwest Passage. As one
well known Arctic geographer recently reminded me, “There’s always going to be winter. And with
winter, the ice will return.” Winter’s recurring presence thus limits the integration of the Arctic and the
North Pacific, at least for now.
While less often argued, I believe as strong a case can be made for EUCOM as the regional command
best suited for the defense of the Arctic, since the most probable emergent threat to northern security
emanates from a bolder, resurgent, resource-enriched Russia, currently the most aggressive of the
Arctic states, as shown by its symbolic 2007 polar flag-planting on the deep sea floor.
Geography sides with the European Command, since Russia owns by far the largest sector of Arctic
coast, and by quirk of geography, the shallowest Arctic continental shelf; so as the Arctic thaws, Russia
will have greater access to a greater share of the Arctic’s long-hidden offshore resource wealth than any
other Arctic state. History also appears to be on the side of the Arctic being viewed as part of EUCOM’s
Area of Operations, as the longest recent conflict in Arctic waters was not the relatively brief battle for
the Aleutians, but the longer Battle of the Atlantic. Even the Maritime Strategy at the Cold War’s end
viewed the Arctic’s undersea domain as primarily a route to contain then-Soviet Russia’s fleet in its
home waters, before it could menace North America. For these reasons, discussed in more detail below,
the key to a secure Arctic, at least while the Arctic remains seasonally frozen and regionally isolated,
remains tied to the fate of Europe, and the ambitions of its largest state: Russia.
World War II and the Battle of the Atlantic
Arctic waters came into play during the six year Battle of the Atlantic from 1939-1945, considered by
many to be the longest continuous military campaign of the Great War. Efforts to assert command of the
seas, especially vital to ensure Britain’s survival as an independent country, but also important for
resupply efforts of our wartime allies including Soviet Russia, and German efforts to deny North Atlantic
waters to us, resulted in an ongoing naval clash between allied and axis sea power. Convoys
resupplying the UK, and lendlease runs to Murmansk, traveled northeast past Newfoundland, through
waters south of Greenland and Iceland, on their way to free Europe; so the high North Atlantic and
Arctic waters have long been viewed through the lens of the Atlantic alliance.
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And after Denmark fell to the Nazis, the Germans eyed Greenland as their first stage of an invasion
route of mainland North America via the Gulf of St. Lawrence through to upper Canada along the Great
Lakes, much the way Britain did during the War of 1812. The vulnerability of Greenland resulted in
America extending defense protection on behalf of the Danish government in exile, which continued
after the war through the entire Cold War era as Soviet naval power grew. Had the Germans gained
possession of Greenland it could have put their fleet in striking distance of Newfoundland, enabling a
two-pronged attack of strategic British territories; so guaranteeing Greenlandic security was viewed as a
necessity to ensure the independence of Britain. Then, had Britain fallen, keeping the Germans out of
Greenland, Newfoundland, and inevitably Canada would have been harder and America’s northeast
maritime frontier and northern land frontier would have been highly vulnerable, much as the Aleutians
were to aggressive use of Japanese naval power.
Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at NPS - Online Journal
http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/WebJournal/Article.aspx?ArticleID=62[10/5/2011 11:28:54 AM]
Whoever Holds Iceland Holds the World
One could take Billy Mitchell’s geopolitical maxim on Alaska from the 1930s (“I believe that, in the future,
whoever holds Alaska will hold the world... I think it is the most important strategic place in the world”)
and apply it to the high North Atlantic – at least with regard to European and North American security. In
this case, whoever holds Iceland and Greenland seems destined to command the North Atlantic. Indeed,
novelist Tom Clancy imagined Iceland becoming the strategic pivot in a future battle for the North
Atlantic between NATO and the Soviet Union; and the role of the G-I-UK gap during the Cold War for
both Soviet and NATO naval strategy was indeed central, though untested by war. The Maritime
Strategy of 1986 likewise viewed the Arctic and the North Atlantic as important areas for forward
operations to contain the projection of Soviet naval power; critics feared it would destabilize deterrence
but in the end it helped reassure Europe that Soviet power was far less potent that Moscow wanted
people to believe.
In terms of economic potential, North Sea oil, the fisheries of the North Atlantic, as well as the sea lanes
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vital for transatlantic trade, all illustrate the strategic-economic importance of the high North Atlantic as a
bridge connecting Europe and North America. As the Arctic thaws, North Atlantic fisheries, natural
resource extraction efforts, and sea lanes will edge further north into Arctic seas, eventually facilitating
the emergence of an Asia-Europe sea bridge – but the fundamental strategic relationship will remain the
same. Consequently, it makes further sense to view the Arctic, as it becomes increasingly navigable and
economically integrated, as an extension of the North Atlantic. With a polar thaw, Northeast Asian
trading states will find a shorter and quicker direct route to markets in Europe, making the security of the
ports in the North Atlantic, and the sea lanes they interconnect, even more valuable.
The longer term potential of trans-Arctic shipping, increased usage of the Northwest Passage, and the
Northern Sea Route, while promising, has a long way to go before being viable – the Koreans, Chinese
and Japanese are eyeing shorter and safe shipping lanes to Europe over the top and the Koreans have
taken the lead with regard to commissioning a new generation of ice-hardened tankers, though the
Russians still dominate when it comes to heavy icebreakers. While connecting Northeast Asian markets
to Europe through an Arctic maritime bridge is compelling, there will always be winter and with winter,
new ice will form in the Arctic basin, limiting the year-round viability of such sea routes – so it is unlikely
that we will see the center of gravity tip entirely toward the Pacific, particularly given the extraordinarily
close and enduring transatlantic relationships that have been forged across centuries of trade, wartime
and peacetime alliances, and the much less united strategic environment in Northeast Asia. 
When transpolar shipping does become more frequent, however, we may find reason for PACOM and
EUCOM to consider joint operations in the Arctic. Even with Asian states eyeing Arctic trade routes, the
North Atlantic still features in most of their plans: Iceland could well become a primary trans-shipment
hub for Asian cargo ships, positioning the high North Atlantic to remain of critical strategic importance.
That may be one reason why Moscow was first to step up with an offer of neighborly assistance to bail
out Iceland when its economy collapsed, hoping to nudge Iceland a bit out of the western camp and help
Moscow expand its influence in the high North Atlantic, counterbalancing the Scandinavian states that
share maritime borders with Russia and which have historically contained its naval influence.
The Inuit Dimension
Beyond Iceland, if Greenland were to become estranged from the West, and ultimately pursued an
unfriendly secession from Denmark and ended up hostile to western interests Moscow may find yet
another friendly island-state open to courtship, and that would certainly favor its strategic position,
putting pressure on the West and its command of the high North Atlantic. But for the moment, its
independence movement is a friendly one, with Denmark’s blessing – but that could always change if the
cost/benefit calculation of Danish sovereignty over Greenland is re-assessed in light of the global thaw.
Going forward, the United States and its NATO allies might be wise cultivate warmer relations with all
the micro-states and territories of the high North Atlantic and Arctic. Alaska and Iceland have especially
close political ties, so this could be a good foundation, leveraging the warm relations state leaders in
Alaska have fostered with Iceland’s government.
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But Greenland may well be the key, since no one at this stage can predict with accuracy where the
sentiment and loyalties of an independent Greenland will lay. If the festering tensions between Europe
and Canada’s Inuit is any indication, there’s much need for some fence-mending. Embracing the Inuit
and their seal-hunting traditions would also go far to reduce tensions between the Inuit and the
Europeans who oppose seal hunting and the fur trade generally, despite their long history of fur empires
which, ironically, fostered their economic colonization of much of North America, from the strategic
trading post at old Fort Niagara where the destiny of the continent was determined two and a half
centuries ago, to the Hudson’s Bay posts scattered across Rupert’s Land, integrating the political
economies of Europe with the high North for the first time in human history. More concerted confidence
building measures (CBMs) could help to ensure that the interests of the Inuit, and of the modern states
that jointly assert sovereignty over their homeland, remain aligned.
This might in turn help thaw relations between the Inuit of Greenland as well as between Canada and
the EU, helping to solidify transatlantic relations and to thereby boost regional security. During
February’s meeting of G7 finance ministers in the Canadian Arctic, Nunavut leaders generously hosted
their international visitors with a taste of northern cuisine, included a staple of their subsistence diet: seal
meat. As Andrew Clark reported in The Guardian, “None of the visiting ministers chose to attend a feast
on Saturday night, laid on by the local Inuit community, at which raw seal was on the menu. Canada’s
Jim Flaherty was left to chow down on some seal meat alone.” Indeed, the refusal of the European G7
finance ministers to dine with the Inuit, and their very undiplomatic decision to disrespect Inuit hospitality
in Nunavut’s capital city by refusing to attend a feast held in their honor by the Inuit, was certainly not
Europe’s best moment. The opportunity to restore a climate of mutual friendship and trust may, with
proper attention, still be with us; but that will take a more strenuous, and respectful, effort by the
Europeans to mend fences with the still disappointed Inuit. This is perhaps why Secretary of State
Clinton recently rebuked her Canadian counterparts for their exclusion of indigenous northerners from
an A5 conference on the future of the Arctic, calling upon her peers to provide the Inuit with a seat at the
table. The Inuit may be few in number, but they control many local economic and political levers, and
their interests are now fully backed by Ottawa – their partner in land claims, self-government, and
northern development. 
Resolving lingering tensions between Europe and the Inuit is a necessary step to ensure the security of
the high North, as greater issues are now in play that could affect the destiny of nations more than one
people’s views of another’s dietary preferences. It wouldn’t take much diplomatic savvy for the Russian
bear to seize the opportunity, and break bread with the Inuit over tasty slabs of whale and seal meat,
hoping to forever drive a wedge between the people of the Arctic and the European states whose
security will increasingly be tied to fate of the Arctic. Secretary Clinton’s overture to the Inuit was thus a
well timed and diplomatically pre-emptive move to ensure the West doesn’t lose the North on her watch.
The Russian Bear
Russian activities in its sector of the Arctic generally focus on its vast, resource-rich and uniquely
shallow continental shelf – which it smartly wants the world to recognize as Russian territorial waters,
and which under UNCLOS will likely be considered largely to be Russian territorial and not high seas. Its
2007 diplomatic stunt beneath the North Pole was less a grab for the polar seabed, and more an
assertion that there is a Russian side of the Arctic. Moscow would very likely welcome the selection of
the North Pole as the boundary point as it was in the Cold War, but UNCLOS and the International
Seabed Authority may, once all the claims are filed and adjudicated, find that Canadian territorial waters
extend past the pole into what Moscow views as its side, depending in part on what the United States,
Canada, and Russia can prove as continental shelf extensions. But it may also find that Russian
territorial waters extend to what many in the West perceive as our side of the Arctic.
The primary Arctic tension – other than that between its indigenous peoples and the broad group of
southerners who assert sovereign claim to the high North – is over offshore boundaries, and here the
main fault line remains between Russia on the one hand, and the West (Canada, the United States, and
its European allies) on the other, even as political tensions thaw between old rivals. The United States
and Canada are cooperating more closely even without agreeing fully on their Beaufort Sea boundary
dispute or the status of the Northwest Passage; and the rhetorically muscular dispute between Ottawa
and the Danes over Hans Island seems mostly for domestic play on both sides.
While in April  2010 Russia and its Cold War rival Norway buried the hatchet and resolved their long-
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simmering disagreements over their offshore boundary line, easing the way forward to the joint
development of the bountiful offshore petroleum resources in the hitherto contested waters, we should
not presume that it will always be smooth sailing ahead. Economic collaboration can, and throughout
history has, yielded to nationalist rivalries and even war between trading partners. In the end, the old
East/West rivalry, with its millennial endurance, may well eventually resurface, much as autopilot
switches on during inclement weather, and this reinforces the notion that the Arctic as a region, and a
potential theatre of conflict, fits logically into EUCOM’s AO and its continuing mission of securing Europe
from external threat.
Russian interests in the vast Eurasian Arctic are largely defined by its exploitation and development of
the enormous natural resource wealth both along and beneath its northern shores, and rehabilitating its
all but abandoned Northern Sea Route to bring this vast treasure chest of northern resources to market.
With its extensive, shallow and increasingly accessible Arctic continental shelf chock full of petroleum
resources in exploitable quantities, Russia has much gain from an Arctic thaw. But by virtue of the
strategic importance of this natural resource wealth to Russia’s economic resurgence, this also provides
ample motivation for Moscow to ensure an adequate defense of its northern domain. It can no longer
count on nature to defense its northern flank with a great wall of ice, and this could increase security
tensions along the old East-West faultline.
Just as Canadians have a powerful emotional attachment to their northern frontier, Russians view their
Arctic lands and seas as an extension of their heartland – which for them has been and remains their
key to their survival, militarily and economically. The intensity of this attachment, and the strategic
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importance of the heartland to Russian geopolitics, which saved the Russian nation from Napoleon’s
armies as it did from Hitler’s, combine to define a vital national interest for Moscow. This means that
Russia, more than the other littoral Arctic states, is more inclined to fully utilize its Arctic assets – though
the post-Soviet economic collapse did lead to a decade-long abandonment of much of its centrally
subsidized mega-projects in the vast and now rusting Russian Arctic, as well as its maritime
infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route. But in recent years, with higher commodity prices changing
the calculus, Moscow has reversed course, and there is now a growing commitment to a fuller utilization
of its Arctic resources, and a growing awareness that Russia’s destiny, and a critical source of its future
wealth, is tied to its fate in the North.
Already there has been a restoration of Arctic naval, land, and air exercises to show the world that
Moscow is serious about its Arctic ambitions, though these may be viewed as largely defensive in
nature. Along its borders, where the defensive nature of its regional military deployments could appear to
be more menacing, this could lead to a re-emergence of historic tensions with its neighbors, especially
after Moscow’s smackdown of Georgia, as symbolic an act as its North Pole flag planting, one that
caught the attention of its many neighbors who united in their critique of the re-awoken bear. After
Georgia, there can be little doubt that Russia would aggressively defend its Arctic interests if Moscow
felt they were threatened.
Still raw is Russia’s loss of empire – first with its 1867 sale of Alaska to the United States, which many in
Russia still feel was nothing short of wholesale theft, a transaction whose history remains clouded by
distrust. The Russian-America Company was shuttered by Moscow after decades of sacrifice and
investment by its explorers, who risked much to explore and colonize the high North Pacific, leaving
many Russians perplexed by the abandonment of Alaska. Some Russian nationalists still include a
Russian Alaska on their maps, though this is largely symbolic and not necessarily a reflection of their
military ambition. In our own time, with the Soviet collapse, Russia became even smaller and more
vulnerable with the loss of its Central European, Central Asia, and Baltic empire. Its remaining Arctic
lands and seas are thus highly valued as a sacred part of Mother Russia, a key to its future, and one of
the last sources of pride and hope that it has left. With new French warships on the way, and more
heavy icebreakers than all of its neighbors combined, Russia may well emerge a predominant regional
power in the high North. 
While Russia was at the table at Ilulissat in 2008 and pledged to support international law and the
UNCLOS mechanism, one must wonder what Moscow would do if the world community sided with
Canada or Denmark in terms of continental shelf extensions, at Russia’s expense. While Moscow has
resolved its border dispute with Norway, a welcome sign of a more collaborative Russia, sentiments and
political winds can change. On the other hand, the Arctic, just as Gorbachev proposed in the 1980s,
could become a compelling testing ground for a new relationship between Russia and the West, and
perhaps – if cooperation trumps competition over time – a path toward eventual NATO membership. But
if competition trumps cooperation in the end, the Arctic may become one of the first regions in which a
newly assertive Russia confronts the West. That’s one more reason why EUCOM will invariably be
drawn into the increasingly salient and ever challenging mission of securing the Arctic.
Pacific Currents
If you look at which countries are Arctic nations, the coastal nations include Russia, Norway,
Denmark/Greenland, Iceland (though its territory is nearly all subarctic, its northern waters lie to the north
of the Arctic Circle), Canada and the United St; and the noncoastal Arctic states include Finland and
Sweden. Most are European, and the non-European Arctic states are NATO members with close
historical, cultural, and strategic links to Europe. Only Russia’s sparsely populated Far East, Alaska’s
equally sparsely settled southern coasts, and Canada’s far western province of British Columbia, abut
Pacific waters.
While Japan made a dramatic but in the end tenuous grab in its militarist past for the high North Pacific,
gaining possession of the Kuriles, Sakhalin, Kamchatka and the Komandorskis, and during the opening
shots of World War II, the outer Aleutians as well, Tokyo’s far northern reign was brief – and currently its
ambitions are primarily defensive in nature. Japan is no longer a major strategic player in the high North
Pacific, owing to the defensive mission of the JMSDF – but with some 110 major warships it remains an
important partner, particularly with regard to countering China’s increasing naval power.
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China has increased its Arctic activities, while at the same time expanding its naval aspirations and
capabilities from brown to blue water, but its primary far northern ambition is most likely to establish a
secure, and dramatically shortened, direct trade route to Europe, and to benefit from the increasing
trade in Arctic natural resources that were formerly inaccessible, and these economic interests would
favor a less aggressive position than Japan took during World War II, which viewed the region’s
resources less collaboratively, and eyed the high North primarily for strategic defense of its home
islands and as a tactical diversion for America’s fleet during the Battle of Midway. With China’s assertion
of greater naval dominance of the South China Sea precipitating a robust balancing reaction by its
neighbors in partnership with the USN, it is unlikely that Beijing will be able to assert naval
predominance over the high North Pacific like Japan did in the first half of the twentieth century. And
while Beijing will compete aggressively for resources, it will likely do so as a member of the world
economy, and not as an external disruptor like Tokyo did in earlier times. China may seek to explore the
Arctic, and in so doing to demonstrate that it has become a great power with global capabilities, but it is
not likely to threaten the security of the Arctic.
So even as Northeast Asia’s populous industrial states eye the thawing Arctic, they view the region
primarily as a gateway to European markets and as a new source of natural resources for their
expanding economies – and less a target for military expansion.
Concluding Thoughts
With Northeast Asian states thinking primarily in terms of trade, and of a thawing Arctic as an emergent
trade route and source of new raw materials for its growing industrial economies, they are unlikely to
pose a strategic threat to the region or to its security.Consequently, the Russian bear stands alone as
the primary Arctic power whose intentions and capabilities could potentially conflict with those of the
West. 
Increasingly, transatlantic relations and the security of the West, and the continuing integration of the
economies of the industrialized Far East with those of the West, will depend upon ensuring the security
of the Arctic – suggesting that EUCOM could be the right command, in the right place, take the lead on
Arctic security and defense issues. EUCOM – like the Arctic – enjoys an intimate proximity to Russia
that ensures their fates will remain tied together for the years that lie immediately ahead. Proximity to an
awakening Russian bear, and experience in taming its more aggressive instincts, will be an important
key to a secure and peaceful north. While it can always be hoped that the bear can be tamed, enticed to
join the West as a friend and partner, one must always be prepared for its more aggressive instincts to
return. EUCOM, whose mission has been to defend the West from the darkest days of the Cold War
through the glorious transformation to the post-Cold War era, has the experience to do both.
In time, as the Arctic becomes more fully integrated, both geophysically into the world ocean,
economically into the world economy, and geostrategically into the world military balance, the idea of an
inter-AO joint command overseeing Arctic security may make increasing sense. But for the time being,
looking to EUCOM may well provide the U.S. armed forces with the necessary organizational structure
and the know-how borne of experience to meet our current Arctic security challenges.
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